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Optimism in Games with Non-Probabilistic Uncertainty
Jiwoong Lee and Jean Walrand
Abstract— The paper studies one-shot two-player games with
non-Bayesian uncertainty. The players have an attitude that
ranges from optimism to pessimism in the face of uncertainty.
Given the attitudes, each player forms a belief about the set
of possible strategies of the other player. If these beliefs are
consistent, one says that they form an uncertainty equilibrium.
One then considers a two-phase game where the players first
choose their attitude and then play the resulting game. The
paper illustrates these notions with a number of games where
the approach provides a new insight into the plausible strategies
of the players.
I. INTRODUCTION
We study a one-shot non-cooperative game of two ratio-
nal players with non-probabilistic information uncertainty.
Specifically, we assume that the set of possible values of the
uncertain parameter is known, but that no prior distribution
is available. Thus, instead of the more traditional Bayesian
approach where user maximize their expected reward, here,
players have an attitude that models their risk-aversion.
An optimistic (respectively, pessimistic) player assumes that
the other player will choose a strategy that is beneficial
(respectively, detrimental) to her. A moderately optimistic
player makes an intermediate assumption. However, in con-
trast with other approaches, we assume that the players
choose their attitude by analyzing the consequences of their
choice, instead of assuming that their risk-aversion is pre-
determined.
Many researchers have explored non-Bayesian models of
uncertainty. Knight [7] raised questions about the suitability
of probabilistic characterizations of uncertainty in some
situations. Allais’ parodox and Ellsberg’s paradox [5] are
examples of situations where decision makers violate the
expected utility hypothesis. More recently, Binmore [2] and
Lec and Leroux [8] explored more philosophical questions
on inaccuracy, arbitrariness, and illegitimacy of Bayesianism
in games. The behavioral sociology literature also reports
that Bayesian strategies fail to occur in some real world
games [10]. A few noteworthy experiments demonstrate a
certainty effect where people prefer less uncertain events,
a refection effect where people respond differently to gain
and loss [1], and preference reversals where people show
different valuations when they buy and when they sell the
same lottery [3]. See also [9] for a related discussion of
the modeling of uncertainty through a family of probability
distributions.
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Different players may have a different objective in the
face of uncertainty. Some popular choices include minimax
regret, maximin pessimism or maximax optimism. Instead of
a fixing a player’s optimization objective, we allow a rational
player to choose somewhere between worst case and best
case. We parametrize a player’s subjective decision criterion
as a convex combination of pessimism and optimism with
parameter pi, and we call it a player’s attitude against
uncertainty. Hurwicz (1951) [6] proposed a similar convex
combination criterion for a single agent decision making
problem. However, one crucial aspect of this study is that the
attitude is not fixed ahead of time. Instead, the players choose
their attitude strategically. Thus, arbitrariness in choosing a
subjective decision criterion disappears while flexibility is
maintained. For instance, the players may realize that the
only rational attitude is to be optimistic because it is the
only Nash equilibrium in a two-stage game where the first
stage is to choose the attitude. More generally, there may be a
set of attitudes for each player from which it is not rational
to deviate unilaterally. In such a case, the model provides
some information about how to behave rationally in the face
of uncertainty.
Section II develops a model of two non-cooperative
players with non-probabilistic parameter uncertainty, and
introduces the notions of attitude and uncertainty equilib-
rium. Section III presents examples for which the approach
provides a new insight into the strategies. Section IV proves
the existence condition of an uncertainty equilibrium and
relates it to a Nash equilibrium of the corresponding full
information game. Section V proves that at least one player
should not be pessimistic. Section VI concludes the paper.
II. UNCERTAINTY EQUILIBRIUM
The section defines the model of game with uncertainty.
It then introduces the notion of uncertainty equilibrium for
players that have specific attitudes. The section then defines
the two-phase game. First, we define a reference game with
full information.
Definition 1 (Certainty Game Go)
Two non-cooperative, selfish and rational players i = 1, 2
and j = 3 − i play a game with strategies x := (x1, x2) ∈
X1,o×X2,o, where Xi,o ⊂ R is i’s closed bounded strategy
interval. Player i has type θi ∈ R. The reward of player
i is real-valued ui(x, θi). This is a full information game
with common knowledge about ui, Xi,o, and θi for all i. We
assume that this game is such that ui(x, θi) is continuous in
(x, θi), has a unique maximizer xi(xj , θi) for every (xj , θi),
and has at least one pure Nash equilibrium.
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We now consider the game with uncertainty about the
opponent’s type.
Definition 2 (Uncertainty Game G)
Player i knows her own true type θi but only that θj ∈ Θj for
j = 3− i, where Θj is a closed bounded real interval, and
this is common knowledge. To avoid triviality, Θj is assumed
to be of non-zero length unless specified otherwise.
The goal of the paper is to study the notion of equilibrium
in such a situation. Our approach is non-Bayesian. That is,
we do assume neither a known posterior distribution of the
parameters nor the existence of a common prior distribution.
We start with a simple approach to refine the set of rational
strategies. Assume that it is known that player i chooses
xi ∈ Xi. It may be reasonable to believe that player j will
choose a strategy xj(xi, θj) for some xi ∈ Xi. Since player i
does not know θj , she may then believe that player j chooses
xj ∈ φj(Xi) where
φj(Xi) := {xj(xi, θj) | xi ∈ Xi, θj ∈ Θj}. (1)
These considerations lead to the following definition.
Definition 3 The sets X1, X2 are consistent if Xj = φj(Xi)
for i = 1, 2 and j = 3− i.
The consistent sets form a product space of strategies
beyond which no rational player plays. Although the sets Xi
are smaller than the original strategy spaces Xi,o, they may
be large and provide little recommendation on the strategies
the players should choose. Moreover, one may question
whether the players will choose strategies in the consistent
sets.
A. Optimism and Pessimism
We now develop a different formulation of the game that
considers the attitudes pi = (pi1, pi2) ∈ [0, 1]2 of players in
the face of uncertainty.
Definition 4 (Game with Attitudes pi: G(pi))
If it is known that player j chooses xj ∈ Xj , then player i
chooses xi ∈ Xi,o to maximize
fi(xi, Xj , θi, 1) := max
xj∈Xj
ui(x, θi)
if she is optimistic and to maximize
fi(xi, Xj , θi, 0) := min
xj∈Xj
ui(x, θi)
if she is pessimistic. In general, for 0 ≤ pii ≤ 1, if player i
has attitude pii, she chooses xi ∈ Xi,o to maximize
fi(xi, Xj , θi, pii)
:= pii max
xj∈Xj
ui(x, θi) + (1− pii) min
xj∈Xj
ui(x, θi).(2)
We primarily study a discrete attitude space pii ∈ {0, 1},
and later use the continuous attitude space pii ∈ [0, 1] in
developing the notion of robust attitude.
Designate by ri(Xj , θi;pii) the set of maximizers of
fi(xi, Xj , θi, pii).
ri(Xj , θi, pii) := arg max
xi∈Xi,o
fi(xi, Xj , θi, pii). (3)
Since player j does not know θi, she assumes that xi ∈
ψi(Xj ;pii) where
ψi(Xj ;pii) :=
⋃
θi∈Θi
ri(Xj , θi;pii). (4)
B. Uncertainty Equilibrium
We then have the following definition.
Definition 5 (Uncertainty Equilibrium of G(pi))
The pair of sets (X1, X2) is an uncertainty equilibrium for
players with attitudes pi, if Xi = ψi(Xj ;pii) for i = 1, 2 and
j = 3− i.
Moreover, if the uncertainty equilibrium is unique, we
consider that player i plays xi ∈ ri(Xj , θi;pii) to maximize
her interim anticipated reward fi(xi, Xj , θi, pii). If the cor-
responding xi is unique and equal to xi(θi, pi), it results in
actual (ex-post) rewards Ui := ui(xi(θi, pi), xj(θj , pi), θi).
If the context is clear, we simplify as Ui(pi) :=
ui(xi(pi), xj(pi), θi) where xi(pi) = xi(θi, pi).
C. Attitude Game
Is it preferable to be optimistic or pessimistic? To answer
this question, we consider a two-stage game.
Definition 6 (Attitude Game A)
In the first stage, the players choose their attitudes (pi1, pi2) ∈
{0, 1}2. In the second stage, they play G(pi) and get the
rewards Ui(pi).
If pi = (0, 0) is a unique Nash equilibrium for the
two-stage game, we conclude that the players should be
pessimistic Moreover, the analysis then specifies precisely
how they should choose their second stage strategy. The
situation is similar if any pi ∈ {0, 1}2 is a unique Nash
equilibrium attitude. A player i’s attitude pi∗i is said to be
dominant if for any pij and θj , j = 3− i,
Ui(pi
∗
i , pij) ≥ Ui(pii, pij)
for all pii.
In contrast with traditional approaches, we do not consider
that players have a fixed attitude (as a type). Instead, they
decide whether to be optimistic or not given the game. They
choose their attitudes by analyzing the game instead of being
driven by a preordained risk aversion.
As we show in the following sections, there are games
where this approach enables to rationalize specific strategies
under uncertainty.
III. EXAMPLES
The first example is a game with negative externality.
In this game, the players should be optimistic even when
they are uncertain about the opponent’s type. The second
example is a Cournot duopoly game [4] with uncertainty.
For this game, we study conditions for the existence of
dominant attitudes, and robust attitudes. For clarity, the
algebraic derivations are in the appendix.
A. A Game with Negative Externality
Consider two players i = 1, 2 consume resource xi ∈ [0, 1]
to gain benefit but also the consumption degrades the quality
of the environment which affects both players. The player’s
reward is defined to be the benefit minus the degradation
of the environment quality. The benefit is assumed to be
proportional to the consumption. The environment degrades
exponentially in sum of players’ consumption (exp{x1 +
x2}), via scaling factor exp{−θi}, where θ−1i captures i’s
susceptibility to the environmental degradation. θi is private
information. xi ∈ [0, 1], θi ∈ [α, β] for some 0 < α < 2α <
β < 1. Operator i’s reward is
ui(x, θi) = xi − exp{−θi + xi + xj}.
(One may add a constant to make the rewards positive.)
Theorem 1 Players should be optimistic and choose the
consumption levels xi = θi − α/2 for i = 1, 2. In contrast,
if θ1, θ2 are fully known and θ1 < θ2, then the only Nash
strategy is (x1, x2) = (0, θ2).
For this game, the only consistent sets (see Definition 3)
are X1 = X2 = [0, β], which provides little information
about the strategies of the players.
B. Cournot Duopoly Game
1) Full Information Case: For i = 1, 2, selfish and
rational player i produces a non-negative quantity xi of
homogeneous items with a non-negative production cost θi ∈
[0, 1/2] per item. The selling price per item is (1−x1−x2)+
where y+ = max{y, 0} for y ∈ <. Accordingly, the reward
(profit) of player i is ui(x, θi) defined as follows:
ui(x, θi) := xi(1− x1 − x2)+ − θixi (5)
where x = (x1, x2).
Player i’s strategy is the quantity xi to produce. The value
of xi that maximizes ui(x, θi) is xi = (1 − θi − xj)/2, for
i = 1, 2 and j = 3−i. The unique solution of these equations
is the Nash equilibrium x? := (x?1, x
?
2) where
x?i = (1− 2θi + θj)/3. (6)
The corresponding utilities are
u?i = x
?
i
2. (7)
Note that the pair x = (x1, x2) that maximizes usocial :=∑
i=1,2 ui(x, θi) is ((1− θ1)/2, 0) when θ1 < θ2. This “so-
cial optimum” is quite different from the Nash equilibrium.
There
usocial = (1− θ1)2/4. (8)
2) Bayesian Uncertainty Case: In a Bayesian model,
one assumes that θ1 and θ2 are independent with known
distributions; each player i = 1, 2 knows θi and only the
distribution of θj for j = 3 − i, and this is common
knowledge. In that case,
E[u1(x, θ1)|x1, θ1] = x1(1− x1 − E[x2|x1, θ1])− θ1x1
and this expression is maximized by
x1 = (1− E[x2|x1, θ1]− θ1)/2 = (1− E(x2)− θ1)/2.
The last expression follows from the observation that x2 is
only a function of θ2 which is independent of θ1. Conse-
quently, for i = 1, 2,
E(xi) = (1− E(xj)− µi)/2 where µi := E(θi).
Solving this system of two equations, we find
E(x1) = (1− 2µ1 +µ2)/3 and E(x2) = (1− 2µ2 +µ1)/3.
Accordingly, for i = 1, 2,
xi = (2− 3θi − µi + 2µj)/6 where j = 3− i. (9)
This solution is a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Note
that player i’s strategy maximizes her interim expected utility
E[ui(x, θi)|xi, θi], rather than the ex post utility ui(x, θi),
which i cannot compute.
3) Game with Attitudes: One assumes that, for i = 1, 2,
player i knows θi but only that θj ∈ Θj := [αj , βj ] for
j = 3 − i where βj ≤ 1/2. This is common knowledge.
Moreover, player i has attitude pii ∈ [0, 1]. The following
result is shown in the appendix.
Theorem 2 The unique uncertainty equilibrium with atti-
tudes pi is the pair of intervals B[si, ti] := [si−ti/2, si+ti/2]
for i = 1, 2, where
si =
1
3
∆jpii − 1
6
∆ipij +
1
12
(4− 3βi − 5αi + 4αj) (10)
and ∆i := βi−αi and ti = (βi−αi)/4. The strategies that
maximize the interim anticipated rewards are
x∗i (pi) =
1
3
∆jpii − 1
6
∆ipij + λi, (11)
where λi = (2− αi + 2αj − 3θi)/6.
Based on this analysis, one considers the two-stage game
A. The following lemma is proved in the appendix.
Lemma 1 (Dominant attitude)
Let θi :=
1
3 (2−βi+4αj−2βj) and θi := 13 (2−αi+4βj−
2αj). Assume that the attitude space is discrete Π = {0, 1}.
1) If θi ≤ θi, then optimism is a dominant strategy for
player i.
2) If θi ≥ θi, then pessimism is a dominant strategy for
player i.
3) If θi < θi < θi, then there is no dominant strategy for
player i.
In particular, if βi < 1/3 for i = 1, 2 (i.e., if the unit
production costs are sufficiently low), both players should
be optimistic.
The game is said to be symmetric if u1 = u2 and Θ1 =
Θ2. The following result corresponds to a symmetric game.
Theorem 3 Consider the game A with Θ1 = Θ2 = [α, β]
where β > α.
1) (PP ) is never a Nash equilibrium.
2) (PP ) is pareto efficient.
3) (PP ) is pareto superior to (OO).
4) O is the dominant strategy if β ≤ max(1/3, 2α). Then
(OO) is the only Nash equilibrium.
Together with 1), 2), and 3), the condition in the last part
makes the attitude game a Prisoner’s Dilemma. The last
condition requires that the costs are not too large.
4) Robust attitude: As we observed from the previous
example, game A may not have a dominant attitude for
player i. In such a case, player i may prefer a strategy
that guarantees the largest minimum ex-post reward. That
is, player i might seek the robust attitude pi]i ∈ [0, 1] defined
by
pi]i := arg maxpii
min
pij
ui(xi(θi, pi), xj(θj , pi), θi).
Theorem 4 The robust attitude of Cournot duopoly does not
coincide with pessimism and is given by
pi]i = min(1, (2− 3θi − βi + 2αj)/4∆j)
for ∆j > 0. Consequently, pi
]
i > 0, except for a singular
case αj = 0 and θi = βi = 1/2.
Example 1 Let β := max(βi, βj). Then if β ≤ 1/4, pi]i =
pi]j = 1. That is, when costs are sufficiently small, the robust
strategy is optimism. To see this, note that pi]i = min(1, (2−
3θi − βi + 2αj)/4(βj − αj)) ≥ min(1, (2− 4β)/4β)) = 1.
IV. EXISTENCE OF UNCERTAINTY EQUILIBRIUM AND ITS
RELATION TO NASH EQUILIBRIUM
This section provides a condition for the existence of an
uncertainty equilibrium.
Theorem 5 (Existence of Uncertainty Equilibrium)
Assume ri(Xj , θi, pii) is single-valued and continuous in
Xj , θi and pii. Then there exists an uncertainty equilibrium
(X∗1 (pi), X
∗
2 (pi)).
At an uncertainty equilibrium (X∗1 (pi), X
∗
2 (pi)), i’s best
response is
x∗i (pi) = ri(X
∗
j (pi), θi, pii).
From the proof of Theorem 5, note there is one-to-one
correspondence between x∗i (pi)’s and X
∗
i (pi)’s via ri’s. In
particular, if Θi is a singleton, then X∗i (pi) = x
∗
i (pi). This
observation is stated in the next theorem.
Theorem 6 Under the assumptions of Theorem 5, G(pi)’s
uncertainty equilibrium (X∗1 (pi), X
∗
2 (pi)) coincides with
game Go’s Nash equilibrium (x?1, x?2) if Θi = {θi} for
i = 1, 2, irrespective of pi.
V. AT LEAST ONE PLAYER DOES NOT PREFER PESSIMISM
We identify conditions when pessimism cannot be domi-
nant for both players.
The first theorem proves this for the non-symmetric
Cournot duopoly game. The following theorem is for a more
general utility structure of symmetric games.
Theorem 7 Both Cournot duopoly players cannot simulta-
neously have pessimism as their dominant attitude.
Now we consider a more general utility function case.
Theorem 8 Consider a symmetric game where ui is strictly
monotonic in xj and ri(xj , θi) is single valued and strictly
monotonic in xj and θi. Then pessimism cannot be a
dominant attitude for any of the two players.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper proposes a framework to analyze two-player
games with non-probabilisitc information uncertainty. The
formulation allows a rational player to choose an attitude
against uncertainty characterized by a degree of optimism.
Corresponding to a pair of attitudes, we define an uncertainty
equilibrium as a pair of sets of strategies from which
rational players would not depart unilaterally. Under some
assumptions, this concept coincides with the traditional Nash
equilibrium when there is no uncertainty. We then define
a two-phase game where players first choose their attitude.
Finally, we illustrate the framework with an investment game
and a Cournot duopoly game with uncertainty. We show that
the framework may identify uniquely the strategies of the
players.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
The partial derivative with respect to xi is 1− exp{−θi+
xi + xj}, which is positive for xi < θi − xj and negative
for xi > θi − xj . Accordingly, the best response xi(xj) is
xi(xj) = [θi − xj ]+. If θi < θj , the only Nash equilibrium
is then xi = 0, xj = θj . The outcome of the game is very
sensitive to the order of the parameters.
Assume i knows that xj ∈ Xj . For z ∈ R, define [z]10 :=
min{max{z, 0}, 1}. Then, if i is optimistic, she maximizes
xi − exp{−θi + xi + αj} where αj = minXj . Thus,
xi = [θi − αj ]10 ∈ [[α− αj ]10, [β − αj ]10].
Also, if i is pessimistic, she maximizes xi−exp{−θi+xi+
βj} where βj = maxXj . Thus,
xi = [θi − βj ]10 ∈ [[α− βj ]10, [β − βj ]10].
Suppose both players are optimistic. Then the only un-
certainty equilibrium is Xi = Xj = [a, b] where a =
α − a and b = β − α. Hence Xi = Xj = [α2 , β − α2 ].
Consequently, xi = θi − α2 and
Ui(1, 1) := θi − α
2
− exp{θj − α}.
Second, suppose both players are pessimistic. Then the
only consistent sets are Xi = Xj = [a, b] where a =
α − b and b = β − b. Hence, Xi = Xj = [α − β2 , β2 ].
Consequently, xi = θi − β2 and
Ui(0, 0) := θi − β
2
− exp{θj − β}.
Third, suppose that player 1 is optimistic and player 2
is pessimistic. In that case, the only consistent sets are
X1 = [a1, b1] and X2 = [a2, b2] where a1 = [α− a2]10, b1 =
[β − a2]10, a2 = [α − b1]10, b2 = [β − b1]10. Hence, X1 =
[α, β] and X2 = {0}. Consequently, x1 = θ1 and x2 =
θ2 − β, so that
U1(1, 0) := θ1 − exp{θ2 − β}.
By symmetry,
U1(0, 1) := θ1 − β − exp{θ2 − β}.
By inspection, we see
U1(1, 0) ≥ U1(0, 0) and U1(1, 1) > U1(0, 1).
Thus, optimism is a dominant strategy for player 1. By
symmetry, it is also dominant for player 2.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
The proof goes in following steps: First we define the
uncertainty set as a ball. Then we show the ball’s radius
is constant. Finally we show the center of the ball is
fixed at equilibrium. Note ui is negatively affine in xj .
Let Xo = [0, 1/2] be the strategy space. Thus inf Xj =
arg supxj∈Xj ui(x, θi) and supXj = arg infxj∈Xj ui(x, θi).
Define
hi(Xj , pii) = pii inf Xj + (1− pii) supXj .
Then fi(xi, Xj , θi, pii) = ui(xi, hi(Xj , pii), θi). From the
first order condition and definition, i’s best response to Xj
becomes
ri(Xj , θi, pii) = (1− hi(Xj , pii)− θi)/2.
This yields
supXi = (1− ri(Xj , pii)− αi)/2
inf Xi = (1− ri(Xj , pii)− βi)/2.
Now let X∗i = B[si, ti] for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i where
B[s, t] is a closed ball or radius t centered at s. Then
ti = (supX
∗
i − inf X∗i )/2 = ∆i/4,
where ∆i := βi−αi. This is independent of X∗i , X∗j , θi, θj .
Now since supX∗j = sj + tj and inf X
∗
j = sj − tj ,
hi(X
∗
j , pii) = sj + tj(1− 2pii).
Define σi := (αi + βi)/4,. Then
si = (supX
∗
i + inf X
∗
i )/2
= (1− ri(X∗j ))/2− σi = (1− sj − tj(1− 2pii))/2− σi
for i = 1, 2. We have two equations relating si and sj . By
solving algebra, we get (10). i’s best response at uncertainty
equilibrium xi = ri(X∗j , θi, pii) becomes (11). B[si, ti] then
is uniquely determined by given (pi, θi,Θi,Θj). To show its
existence, it is sufficient to show B[si, ti] ⊂ Xo. To see
this, it is straightforward to verify min si + ti ≤ supXo and
max si − ti ≥ inf Xo for all combinations of pi,Θ1,Θ2.
C. Proof of Lemma 1
1) We need to find a condition, without loss of generality,
such that (i) u1(OO) ≥ u1(PO) and (ii) u1(OP ) ≥
u1(PP ) for every θ2 ∈ [α2, β2]. By algebra,
u1(OO)− u1(PO) ≥ ∆2[θ1 − θ1]/12,
which is non-negative for all θ1 ≤ θ1 := 13 (2 − β1 +
4α2 − 2β2) and for all θ2. (ii) is immediate because
u1(OP )− u1(PP ) ≥ u1(OO)− u1(PO).
2) Similar development yields θi ≥ θi where θi := 13 (2−
αi − 2αj + 4αi).
D. Proof of Theorem 3
1) We show at least one player always have an incentive
to deviate from (PP ). This part of the theorem is true
even for non-symmetric Θ1 and Θ2. Define ui(pi) :=
ui(x
∗
i (pi), x
∗
j (pi), θi) and ∆ = β − α. Suppose player 1
does not have the incentive to deviate from (PP). That
is, u1(PP ) ≥ u1(OP ). Then we prove by showing
u2(OP ) > u2(PP ). From the proof of Lemma 1,
u1(PP ) ≥ u1(OP ) is equivalent to 3θ1 ≥ 2 − 3α −
2β + 6θ2. Then, u2(PO) − u2(PP ) = ∆136 (2 − 3α −
2β + 6θ1 − 3θ2) ≥ ∆136 (6 − 9α − 6β + 9θ2) > 0.
The last inequality comes from the boundary condition
0 ≤ α ≤ θi ≤ β ≤ 1/2.
2) We show that a rival player’s optimistic attitude
is always detrimental: 36(u1(PP ) − u1(PO)) =
∆(6x1(PP ))+∆(6−6θ1−6x1(PP )−6x2(PP )−∆) >
0. We can similarly show 36(u1(OP )− u1(OO)) > 0.
At (PP ), suppose one player has incentive to change
to O. That change hurts the ex post utility of the other
player. This concludes (PP ) is pareto efficient.
3) We need to show ui(PP ) > ui(OO). To see this,
36(ui(PP )− ui(OO)) = 12∆x1(PP )−∆(6− 6θ1 −
6x1(PP )− 6x2(PP )− 2∆) = ∆(2 + 2α+ 2β− 3θ1−
3θ2) ≥ 0.
4) If β ≤ max(1/3, 2α), then θi ≥ β ≥ θi for all i, and
importantly, this fact becomes a common knowledge.
From Lemma 1, O is the dominant strategy. Together
with 1), 2) and 3), this constitutes a Prisoner’s Dilemma
game.
E. Proof of Theorem 4
ui(q
∗(pi), θi) is non-increasing in pij for all possible com-
binations of parameters. Thus ui is minimized at pij = 1. ui
is convex in pii. From the first order condition, the result is
immediately obtained.
F. Proof of Theorem 5
Since ri is continuous in θi, and Θi is a bounded and
closed interval, Xi is a closed interval. Let Xi = [xi, xi] ⊂
Xi,o, xi ≤ xi. We define a map φ(xi, xi) = (x′i, x′i) such
that
Xi rj(Xi, θj ,πj)
ri(Xj , θi,πi) Xj
rj
ri
θi ∈ Θi θj ∈ Θj
φi
Fig. 1: φi mapping
x′i = arg min
θi∈Θi
ri([xj , xj ], θi, pii)
x′i = arg max
θi∈Θi
ri([xj , xj ], θi, pii)
where
xj = arg min
θj∈Θj
rj([xi, xi], θj , pij)
xj = arg max
θj∈Θj
rj([xi, xi], θj , pij).
From construction x′i ≤ x′i. If φi is a continuous map-
ping, then by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there exists
(x∗i , x
∗
i ) ∈ X2i,o such that
φi(x
∗
i , x
∗
i ) = (x
∗
i , x
∗
i ).
Then Xi = [x∗i , x
∗
i ] is, by definition, an uncertainty equilib-
rium. Now we show that φi is continuous in xi, xi.
Let v := y(xi, xi) := arg supxi∈[xi,xi] uj(xj , xi, θj)
and define z such that xi −  ≤ z ≤ xi + . Then
lim→0 uj(xj , z, θj) = uj(xj , xi, θj) from uj’s continuity.
There are two cases: (1) y(xi, xi) > xi. Then y(z, xi) =
y(xi, xi) as for small . (2) y(xi, xi) = xi. Then xi −  ≤
w := y(z, xi) ≤ xi + . As a result
sup
xi∈[z,xi]
uj(xj , xi, θj)− sup
xi∈[xi,xi]
uj(xj , xi, θj)
= uj(xj , w, θj)− uj(xj , xi, θj)→ 0
as → 0 from uj’s continuity.
Therefore supxi∈[xi,xi] uj(xj , xi, θj) is continuous in xi.
Similarly we can show it is continuous in xi. These steps
can be repeated for infxi∈[xi,xi] uj(xj , xi, θj). As a result fj
and rj are continuous in xi, xi. Since rj is continuous in θj
and Θj is a closed and bounded interval, Xj := [xj , xj ] :=
{rj([xi, xi], θ˜j , pij |θ˜j ∈ Θj} is a closed interval too. Using
the same procedure, x′i and x
′
i are continuous in xj , xj . Since
φi is a composite function of continuous functions in xi, xi,
φi is therefore continuous in (xi, xi). This completes the
proof.
G. Proof of Theorem 6
Let Θi = {θi} for all i. Then for arbitrary Xj , Xi :=
{ri(Xj , θi, pii)|θi ∈ Θi} is a singleton. Let Xi = {x†i}. Then
x†j := rj(Xi, θj , pij) = arg max
xj∈Xj,o
uj(xj , x
†
i , θj)
is j’s best response function of game Go when j predicts i
plays x†i . By assumption an equilibrium of this is a (x
?
1, x
?
2).
And by construction, it is also an uncertainty equilibrium
(X∗1 (pi), X
∗
2 (pi)) of G(pi), and it does not depend on pi.
H. Proof of Theorem 8
Suppose player 1’s dominant attitude is pessimism. From
Lemma 1, this implies
β1 ≥ θ1 ≥ θ1 = (2− α1 + 4β2 − 2α2)/3.
Now then,
θ2 = (2− α2 + 4β1 − 2α1)/3
≥ (14− 10α1 − 11α2 + 7β2)/9 + β2 > β2.
Thus θ2 ≤ β2 < θ2. Therefore pessimism cannot be player
2’s dominant strategy.
I. Proof of Theorem 8
Consider player 1 representatively. We will show
U1(OO) > U1(PO) for some θ2 ∈ Θ2. Let u := ui,
r := ri and Θ := [α, β] = Θi for i = 1, 2. α < β. As one
case, assume ui is strictly decreasing in xj , ri is decreasing
in xj and θi both. The conclusion is the same if any of
‘decreasing’ condition is changed to ‘increasing’ condition.
Define equilibrium sets for each pi as follows:
X1 = X2 = [a, b] for pi = (OO)
X1 = X2 = [c, d] for pi = (PP )
X1 = [e, f ], X2 = [g, h] for pi = (OP )
X1 = [g, h], X2 = [e, f ] for pi = (PO).
Then
a = r(a, β) and b = r(a, α)
c = r(d, β) and d = r(d, α)
e = r(g, β) and f = r(g, α)
g = r(f, β) and h = r(f, α).
From monotonicity of r, we draw relation one by one: From
a = r(a, β) and d = r(d, β), it is immediate to see a < d.
Noting d = r(r(d, α), α) and g = r(r(g, α), β), we get g <
d. Thus d < f from d = r(d, α) and f = r(g, α). From
a < f , we get g < a. Finally we get a < e. Take θ2 = β.
Then,
U1(OO) = u(x1(θ1, OO), x2(θ2, OO), θ1)
= u(r(a, θ1), r(a, θ2), θ1)
= u(r(a, θ1), r(a, β), θ1)
= u(r(a, θ1), a, θ1)
> u(r(f, θ1), a, θ1)
> u(r(f, θ1), e, θ1) = U1(PO)
Therefore pessimism cannot be a dominant attitude in a
symmetric game.
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